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Abstract—The Strategic Risk Register System (SRRS) is proposed by the authors as a practical methodology to 
enable the connectivity of risks to be elicited and evaluated so that the most potent risks in a system can be identified. 
The SRRS methodology builds on the impact × likelihood paradigm by introducing a connectivity matrix to modify 
traditional risk registers and uses graph theories to depict the relations between risks. Several techniques are employed 
to visualize and interpret the significance of the results. A case study is used to demonstrate how the SRRS works in 
practice. This paper builds on the 3­year research programme called STRATrisk, commissioned by the Department for 
Trade and Industry (Dti) in the UK, which reported that the assessment of the interconnectivity of risks is necessary to 
understand key risks in complex systems. 
INTRODUCTION 
With the progress of globalization, more people are 
endeavoring to understand risks in alternative ways. 
Sociologist, Ulrich Beck (1992), in his seminal paper, Risk 
Society, implied that people can no longer make decisions with 
certainty or complete information. He argued that the 
incremental changes in social practices and knowledge in a 
modern society eventually exposes that society to complex and 
significant risks that are created by the spontaneous 
interconnectivity of those small hidden changes. He 
highlighted risks are no longer confined within certain 
boundaries and they are easily distributed and spread. 
Beck (1992) reminds us that risks are related to people’s 
decision making. The perceived complexity and ambiguity of 
modern decisions leads to decisions and associated risks being 
fueled by ignorance or biased knowledge. Campbell and Currie 
(2006), suggest that conventional risk approaches cannot deal 
with the immeasurability of modern risks, leading to people’s 
incapability in understanding current risks. Recent failures of 
financial institutions caused by complex derivatives shows that 
even professionals can be overwhelmed by the ambivalence 
and incalculability of risk 
The civil engineering industry is not immune from such 
global turbulence. Many large companies have disappeared or 
suffered from sharp drops in profits. Allan et al (2007) refer to 
these as strategic risks and recommends that system thinking 
provides a way to manage the systemic behaviour of emerging 
risks by understanding their interconnectivity and structure. 
The aim of this paper is to help engineering companies 
capture a holistic view of their strategic risks and provide a 
practical methodology to achieve that objective. The following 
section will briefly review current risk management practices, 
along with an overview of the systems thinking philosophy 
used in our approach. We then provide details of the Strategic 
Risk Register System (SRRS) methodology, including a case 
study to demonstrate the application and implementation 
issues. 
BACKGROUND 
Risk and Risk Management in Practice 
Risk is often described as ‘an uncertain event or condition 
that, if it occurs, has a positive or negative effect on a project 
objective’ (PMI, 2000). In broader terms, risk ‘reflects 
variation in the distribution of possible outcomes, their 
likelihoods, and their subjective values’ (March and Shapira, 
1987). Mathematically, risk is ‘the probability of occurrence of 
loss/gain multiplied by its respective magnitude’ (Jaafari, 
2001), or 
R = I × L (1) 
In practice, the specific context of risks is also important and 
defined differently across industries and functions of a 
company, e.g. financial risks, human resource risks, market 
risk, legal risk, etc (Pickford, 2001). Moreover, risk 
management has become an integrated part of management 
functions. Although risk management tends to be tailored to a 
firm’s industry and strategy, it is not hard to identify 
commonalities. Pickford (2001) identifies 7 key risk 
management processes: identification, assessment, analysis, 
design, implementation, review and audit. Furthermore, some 
risk management techniques are more prevalent, such as 
Critical Path Analysis (CPA) (Pierce, 1998), Failure Mode and 
Effect Analysis (FMEA) (Mikulak et al, 1996), Probability and 
Impact Grids (Stewart and Melchers, 1997), and Monte Carlo 
Simulations (Goodwin, 2004). Yet risk registers remain the 
most common risk management tool used by engineering 
companies (Crossland et al, 1998). 
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Some of the Recent Trends 
Both academics and practitioners continually innovate risk 
management to meet the challenges of uncertainty in modern 
risks. Ward and Chapman, (2003) advocate that risks should be 
treated as uncertainties, using a reflective approach and an open 
modifiable strategy. Recent research (Allan and Davis, 2006, 
Merna, 2005) tend to integrate complexity and systems 
thinking into risk management. In particular, Allan and Davis 
(2006) suggest that risk behaves as a complex system and has a 
hierarchy of influences, such as strategic, project and 
operational. The natural development from this complex 
systems approach is that individual risks are by definition 
connected to other risks in the risk system, albeit to a lesser or 
greater extent. The challenge for risk managers is to identify 
and measure the strength or potency of these risk connections 
so that risk emergence can be identified and controlled (Nielson 
2006). 
Risk Registers 
Conventionally, a risk register is ‘a repository of a corpus of 
knowledge’ and ‘initiates the analysis and plans that flow from 
it’ (Williams, 1993 and 1994). In most cases, a risk register 
contains relevant information of a risk, including the 
description of the risk, its impact, its probability of occurrence, 
owner of the risk, reduction and mitigation plan. Among those 
features, the most prominent ones are the impact and the 
probability of occurrence, both of which have severe 
limitations in an uncertain environment. 
The two­dimensionality of risk, in terms of impact and 
probability, cannot provide a solid and robust foundation for 
understanding risks in a risk register (Williams, 1996). Only 
through understanding the interconnectivity of risks does the 
decision maker arrive at a holistic view of the risk system 
(Allan et al, 2007). However, current techniques do not 
consider the interconnectivity of risks or measure the 
consequence of connections. Risks continue to be analyzed in 
isolation to other risks which of course is not what happens in 
real life. 
Interestingly, risk registers are used at different levels in 
larger organisations and projects, with high probability and 
high impact risk being escalated to the next level in the 
hierarchy. Very rarely do senior managers attend to risks in a 
register lower down the project or organisational structure. Yet, 
the hidden small changes in risks, distributed across risk 
registers in the organisation and yet connected in some, can 
reveal systemic risks brewing just under the normal detection 
radar. Current risk registers can easily be extended to provide 
the richness of information to senior managers that are required 
to spot emerging risks. 
System Thinking 
Systems thinking aims to recognize, organize, analyze, and 
resolve problems systemically (Checkland and Scholes, 1990). 
System tools can be roughly categorized as hard or soft system 
approaches, and the combination of tools required depends on 
the issues or problems that are to be resolved. After defining a 
specific system or problematic situation, boundaries and 
elements can be identified. Then, related objects or concepts 
can be modeled together within this framework. Although there 
is no single system approach, they share common 
characteristics which have been demonstrated to help manage 
uncertain, dynamic and complex environments (Checkland and 
Scholes, 1990). 
One such approach is cognitive mapping. Typically, not all 
necessary information and knowledge is available, so decision 
makers have to utilize their heuristic judgments to rationalize 
the decision­making behaviour. In this sense, it is necessary to 
depict and explore the cognitive structure of decision makers 
(Walker, 2005). If participants’ expert knowledge can be 
elicited, this method can be highly effective. Methods such as: 
causal mapping, semantic mapping, and concept mapping, are 
valid and reliable, (Buzman, 1993, Huff, 1990, Keng and Xin, 
2006, and Eden, 1998). Additionally some mathematic 
techniques, such as graph theories and factor analysis, can be 
employed to explore further connections in the cognitive maps. 
Summary 
Current risk management techniques cannot sufficiently 
manage risks due to the constraints of two­dimensionality and 
therefore it is necessary to rethink the problem from the 
conceptual level. Systems thinking provides a new way of 
understanding risk behaviour. This leads to a more reflective 
approach towards risks and emphasis the interconnectivity 
between risks.. 
To implement these concepts, especially in an engineering 
management context, we propose a methodology to add new 
elements to conventional risk registers and hence allow people 
for understanding the emergent properties of the risks. 
OUR APPROACH 
Soft systems approaches (Checkland 1990) and cognitive 
mapping have been proposed to aid holistic thinking and the 
understanding of the interrelatedness of risks (Lewin and Allan 
2006). However, these techniques are unfamiliar to engineering 
managers. There is a need to develop techniques that can 
introduce the complexity of interconnectivity, whilst remaining 
familiar and pragmatic. Using existing risk register and 
integrating risk’s third dimension, connectivity, can 
complement current methodologies. We propose the Strategic 
Risk Register Systems (SRRS) that uses linear algebra and 
graph theories to calculate and visualize connectivity between 
risks. 
Assessing Risks 
In the next section risk factors are denoted as R1, R2… Rz. 
The impact of a risk and its probability of occurrence is 
simplified as impact (I) and likelihood (L) and they are 
measured with traditional qualitative or quantitative methods. 
The output from this process can be recorded as L1, L2…Lz, and 
I1, I2…Iz respectively. 
It should be noted that the qualitative descriptions are 
translated into the quantitative terms. For example, a series 
description of ‘high, medium, low, and negligible’ may be 
quantified as ‘1, 0.5, 0.1, and 0.05’. Detailed techniques to 
transform qualitative measures into quantitative terms can be 
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found in (Goodwin, 2004) but there are two special 
considerations for selecting 0.05 as the lower end of the scale 
rather than zero. Firstly, system literature, (Marchal, 2003), 
suggests that when taking a holistic approach to a system, all 
elements are potential connected and secondly a 0.05 or 0.01, is 
adopted by statisticians as being of negligible significance 
(Newbold et al, 2007). 
An elicitation process of connectivity is needed to ensure 
participants adopt a reflective approach in thinking about risks. 
Ren (1994) states that risk can ‘mutually affect, impede and 
promote each other’ and the relationship between risks can be 
‘independent, dependent, parallel and series’. Also, hierarchical 
influences, geographical adjacency, logical sequential order 
and timeliness shall be taken into consideration. The 
connectivity of risk factors can be derived pair­wisely and 
measured using the same range between negligible (0.05) and 
extremely high (1). Individual connectivity can be coded as C12, 
C13 …Cmn …C(z­1)z, and allocated into Matrix (2). 
1 C12 C13 ... C 1Z  
  
C 1 C ... C 21 23 2Z Connectivity Matrix: (2) 
C ........C ........ 

 
m1 mn 
 
Cz1 Cz2 ,..............1 

Processing and Visualizing Data 
With the SRRS the individual risk factors are measured with 
three parameters, likelihood (L), impact (I) and connectivity 
(C). In traditional approaches, the expectation of an individual 
risk equals likelihood (L) times impact (I), which is 
demonstrated in Equation (1). The potency values of risks can 
be obtained by integrating the expectations (R) and 
connectivity (C) values using the algorithm below in Equation 
(3): 
( ) = (R
m 
+ R
n 
) 
mn 
P Potency × C (3) 
Where m and n indicates the m­th and n­th risk. If m equals n, 
we assume the potency value equals the expectation value of 
the risk. Moreover, since values of likelihood and impact can be 
ordinal or interval numbers, the value of the outcome P, stands 
for either relative or absolute values respectively. 
Equation (3) indicates that the potency of a pair of risks is not 
only determined by the robustness of connectivity itself, but 
also by the expectations of risk factors. On the other hand, the 
influences of this risk pair are adjusted by their 
interconnections. This approach allows for risks to activate 
others risks and vice­a­versa. The potency values are located in 
Matrix (4). 
R1 P12 P13 ... P 1Z  
  
P R P ... P 21 2 23 2Z Potency Matrix: (4) 
P ........P ......  
 
m1 mn 
 
Pz1 Pz2 ,..........P z 

As each value on the diagonal of the matrix influences both 
the column and row in which it is located, it is straightforward 
to normalize the matrix and to elicit the relative importance of 
each risk. The method we used for this is similar to one of the 
normalization methods that are proposed by the Analytical 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1980), which is: 
1. Calculate the mean value of a row and locate it into every 
grid in the row; 
2. Calculate the mean value of the column and locate it into 
every grid in the column; 
3. Calculate the weighted value of every gird by averaging 
column and row values for that grid. 
The results can be demonstrated in Matrix (6): 
P' 1 P' 12 P' 13 ... P' 1Z  
  
P' P' P' ... P' 21 2 23 2Z Normalized Potency Matrix: (5) 
P' ........P' ........  
 
m1 mn 
 
P' z1 P' z2 ,..........P' z  
For any grid in Matrix (4), the normalized potency value is 
z z 
∑P + ∑ Pmn mn 
P ' mn = 
m=1 n=1 
(6) 
2z 
Values on the diagonal of Matrix (5) represent the potency of 
individual risk factors correspondingly. Furthermore, the 
normalized potency matrix can be visualized using graph 
theory. Every value in an adjacency matrix can indicate the 
causal or other logic relationships between the two variables, 
including the connectiveness (Wilson, 1996). Matrix (5) can be 
transformed into an adjacency matrix by selecting criteria to 
determine whether a potency value is tolerable for the business 
or not. Then, risks can be displayed as nodes, and potency 
values of risk pairs can be viewed as the edges between nodes. 
We therefore have the ability to represent the inter­connectivity 
of a risk system which gives an understanding of which are the 
key potent risks and why. 
Thus, risk factors can be ranked and prioritized. 
Numerically, the greater potency value is, the more important a 
risk is; graphically, the more connected a risk is, the more 
important it is. This approach allows for the visualization of 
how risks are interrelated and structured. It also provides a story 
of how risks can develop and propagate thereby enabling 
managers to put in place appropriate mitigation measures. 
Detailed steps of this process are explained in the case study 
example below. 
CASE STUDY 
A simplified real case study has been selected to demonstrate 
the implementation procedures of the SRRS and provide an 
example of the reflective insights that can be achieved from the 
graphical representation of the connectivity. The case study 
draws on experience from a large UK civil engineering 
company and one of the project level risk registers was selected 
as the data source. The connectivity values were elicited from 
the project team via interview and a spreadsheet­based 
questionnaire. For clarity, the size of the SRRS is reduced to 
six columns and rows though the software can, theoretically at 
least, accommodate any number of risks . 
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THE CASE STUDY 
Data Input and Processing 
The simplified risk register of the civil engineering company is 
presented in Exhibit 1.The values of likelihood (L) and impact 
(I) and connectivity (C) are derived from the results of a 
five-interval, or six-point, Likert Scale questionnaire. 
Participants illustrate their qualitative description of the scale, 
in terms of negligible, quite low, low, high, very high, and 
extremely high. After discussing the relative importance of 
numerical values, we attribute 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8 and 1 to 
qualitative descriptions correspondingly. For example, if 
interviewees consider ‘insufficient financial supply (C. 
Financial Risk) is likely to interrupt daily operation of the 
project team (B. Operational Risk)’, the connectivity of the two 
risks can be recoded as C32=0.8 and it will go to row 3, column 
1. All the connectivity values are then inputted into the matrix 
as demonstrated in matrix (7). 
 
[Insert Exhibit 1] 
 
Example of Connectivity Data Input Matrix:    
                           
         A        B        C        D        E        F  
A       1        1        0.8     0.8      0.2      0.8 
B      0.5      1        0.5     0.8      0.5       1
C      0.8      0.8      1       0.8      0.5      0.2
D      0.2     0.2      0.5       1      0.05     0.8
E      0.05   0.2      0.1     0.1        1       0.2
F      0.5     0.05    0.2     0.05    0.05      1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        (7) 
The potency values of every risk and every pair of risks can be 
calculated using Equation (1) and (3) and the results are 
demonstrated in the following matrix (8): 
Potency Matrix:
              A            B             C            D            E            F  
A       0.1000    0.3000    0.4000    0.0960    0.0240    0.1120
B       0.1500    0.2000    0.3000    0.1760    0.1100    0.2400
C       0.4000    0.4800    0.4000    0.3360    0.2100    0.0880
D       0.0240    0.0440    0.2100    0.0200    0.0020    0.0480
E       0.0060    0.0440    0.0420    0.0040    0.0200    0.0120
F       0.0700    0.0120    0.0880    0.0030    0.0030    0.0400
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    (8) 
As described above, because each value in the matrix is 
affected by the value on the diagonal, Matrix (8) can be 
normalized. Matrix (9) then contains the final potency values 
for individual risks which are highlighted. 
Normalized Potency: 
              A            B             C            D            E            F  
A           0.1760    0.2060    0.1389    0.1168    0.1310
B       0.1605        0.2180    0.1509    0.128
0.1485
0.1880 8    0.1430
C       0.2220    0.2495       0.2124    0.1903    0.2045
D       0.0915    0.1190    0.1490        0.0598    0.0740
E       0.0732    0.1007    0.1307    0.0636        0.0
0.2795 
0.0819
0.0414 557
F       0.0805    0.1080    0.1380    0.0709    0.0488    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.0630
  (9) 
Data Interpreting and Visualizing 
In the original Risk Register, risks are treated as a set of 
isolated factors. In some circumstances, the importance of 
individual risks cannot be distinguished, i.e., D and E. Bringing 
the connectivity of risks into consideration, a greater 
understanding of the risks is presented. Values on the diagonal 
of Matrix (9) indicate the relative importance of the potency 
values of risk factors, which can be utilized to assist decision 
makers to focus on the risk that may seed the system. In this 
case, risk factor D has a greater influence than E, the political 
risk, and therefore D needs more attention from key decision 
makers.  
Furthermore, an adjacency matrix can help capture a visual 
representation of the result. The first step is to select a potency 
value, which indicates the risk tolerance. For example, if a 
manager adopts a risk-averse approach and cannot tolerate 
risky behaviour in the project process, he or she may choose a 
relatively low potency value. This will lead to more risks are 
connected and thus the manager has to tender the individual 
risks as well as the connected part of the risk system. On the 
other hand they may select a larger potency value, allowing the 
identification of the most influential risks.  
Then, the adjacency matrix can be obtained by comparing 
values in the Normalized Potency Matrix (9) with the 
pre-selected potency value. If a value in Matrix (9) is greater 
than the pre-selected potency value, it can represent an edge, 
connecting a risk pair, and the value can be recorded as 1 in the 
adjacency matrix. Otherwise, the value in the adjacency matrix 
is 0 correspondingly. It should be noted that the diagonal of the 
adjacency matrix is intentionally left blank since the 
self-connectiveness is not relevant to this paper. For instance, if 
the potency value is selected as 0.15, the adjacency matrix can 
be obtained as 
Adjacency Matrix:    
 0     1     1     1     1     1
 1     0     1     1     1     1
 1     1     0     1     1     1
 0     1     1     0     0     0
 0     1     1     0     0     0
 0     1     1     0     0     0















 

            (10) 
Thus, the adjacency matrix can be visualized as what we refer 
to as a Risk Map. It is illustrated as Exhibit 2: 
[Insert Exhibit 2] 
 
With the change of pre-selected potency value, a series of risk 
maps can be drawn. The following table demonstrates how the 
risk factors are connected four in different scenarios 
[Insert Exhibit 3] 
 
Implications  
There are several implications that emerge from the SRRS 
approach: 
•   The potency of risks is represented as the values on the 
diagonal of the normalized matrices. Through potency 
measures risks can be understood more holistically which is 
particularly important for complex organisations.  
•    The selection of a potency value is largely determined by 
the risk appetite and availability of risk management resources 
and is also useful as a what-if tool.  
 •    Risks with strategic importance can be identified. 
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Managers can interpret the risk management resources 
quantitatively in terms of potency value, or they can simply 
observe the change in shape of the risk map with different 
potency values. The more connected, the more important a risk 
is. In this case study, Financial Risk (Risk C) is crucial for the 
civil engineering company and is the key strategic risk in this 
project, not surprisingly perhaps. .  
• Risks with similar ratings in conventional approaches are 
now differentiated. D is more important than B and managers 
might want to revisit the importance of this.  
•   The risk maps can change when selected potency value 
changes. This indicates that when risk management resources 
become critical, which could be expressed as the increase of 
potency value, some risks will be decoupled from the 
connected part of a map and become isolated. For instance, 
when the potency value is selected as 0.65, Risk B and E are 
disconnected suggesting that managers should place more 
focus on the connected part of the risk map.  
• Risk management strategies can be designed to target key 
nodes. For instance, when Risk C is controlled, the overall 
structure of the risks is much simplified. Also interventions can 
be planned to control the domino effects of risks more 
effectively 
   •  The reaction mechanisms of the risk set can be 
understood. The potential interaction between new risks and 
current risks is not well treated using conventional techniques 
but SRRS is useful in making the cause and effect more 
explicit.  
• Researchers (Thompson, 2002; Allan and Davis, 2006) 
point out that effective communications of risk issues is 
essential to achieving effective risk strategies. The ‘risk map’ 
shows the necessary path of communication that will help 
mitigate the propagation of risks 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper proposes that connectivity is the third dimension 
of risk and introduces the concept of a risk system. A method of 
investigating the interconnectedness of risks within a risk 
register framework is proposed to provide a more holistic 
analysis of risk. A case study has been provided to demonstrate 
the approach in practice. The advantage of visualizing the 
connectivity of risks is significant but raises the issue of data 
collection and interpretation. Further research into streamlining 
the data collection methods and integrating multiple layers of 
risk register are ongoing.   
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Exhibit 1: Risk Register 
Risk Factor Impact 
(I) 
Likelihood 
(L) 
Expectation 
(I×L) 
A. Technology 
Risk 
1.0 0.1 0.1 
B. Operational 
Risk 
0.50 0.40 0.20 
C. Financial 
Risk 
0.80 0.50 0.40 
D. Legal Risk 0.20 0.10 0.02 
E. Political 
Risk 
0.20 0.10 0.02 
F. Reputation 
Risk 
0.80 0.05 0.04 
Exhibit 2: Risk Map at Potency Value = 0.15 
Exhibit 3: Risk Maps at Different Potency Values 
Potency. Level: P=0.03 Potency. Level: P=0.08 
Potency. Level: P=0.10 Potency. Level: P=0.20 
